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Abstract: 
 
In a time when the rising costs of education have deterred students from seeking a 
college degree, finding a cost-effective alternative to a traditional university has become 
an increasingly important issue.  This study seeks to evaluate the labor market returns to 
earning a degree online versus a traditional university through an econometric regression 
based on survey data of recent graduates from online and traditional 
universities.  Regression analysis compares average income for graduates of online and 
traditional institutions while controlling for measures of school type, characteristics, 
selectivity, and region at the institutional level. The effect of college type on average 
income was statistically indistinguishable from zero.  However, there were statistically 
significant and positive returns to college selectivity and quality.  A calculation of the net 
present value of attending an online university versus a traditional university 
demonstrates that there are positive returns to attending a traditional university. 
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LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: List of variables 
 
Variable Category  Definition Unit 
AVGINC2 Dependent Variable Average income of 
graduates from each 
school 
Percent 
STUFACR College Quality Student-to-faculty 
ratio 
Number 
ENROLLMENT College Quality Total enrollment Number 
GRADRATE1 Student Ability Graduation rate Percent 
NETTUITION College Quality Net tuition each 
student pays, on 
average 
Dollars 
PROFIT College Type Whether the school 
is a for-profit 
institution 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
PUBLIC College Type Whether the school 
is a public 
institution 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
TYPE College Type Whether the school 
is an online-only 
university 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
MOSTCOMP Selectivity Whether the school 
is ranked as a ‘most 
competitive’ school 
in the Barron’s 
selectivity rankings 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
HIGHLYCOMP Selectivity Whether the school 
is ranked as a 
‘highly competitive’ 
school in the 
Barron’s selectivity 
rankings 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
VERYCOMP Selectivity Whether the school 
is ranked as a ‘very 
competitive’ school 
in the Barron’s 
selectivity rankings 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
COMP Selectivity Whether the school 
is ranked as a 
‘competitive’ school 
in the Barron’s 
selectivity rankings 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
LESS COMP Selectivity Whether the school 1 = yes; 0 = no 
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is ranked as a ‘less 
competitive’ school 
in the Barron’s 
selectivity rankings 
SPECIAL Selectivity Whether the school 
is ranked as a 
‘special’ school in 
the Barron’s 
selectivity rankings 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
WEST Region Whether the school 
is located in the 
western region 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
MIDWEST Region Whether the school 
is located in the 
mid-western region 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
SOUTH Region Whether the school 
is located in the 
southern region 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
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Table 2: Regression Output with the Dependent variable as the average of the log of the 
minimum and maximum income 
 
Dependent Variable: AVGINC2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/01/14   Time: 15:25   
Sample: 1 848    
Included observations: 814   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.749606 0.009562 496.7238 0.0000 
STUFACR 0.000738 0.000383 1.926747 0.0544 
EFYTOTLT_EF2012A_ 5.94E-08 9.51E-08 0.624695 0.5323 
NETTUITION 6.75E-07 2.40E-07 2.806092 0.0051 
GRADRATE1 -0.048978 0.032045 -1.528433 0.1268 
PROFIT 0.042510 0.034204 1.242828 0.2143 
PUBLIC 0.000895 0.005615 0.159324 0.8735 
TYPE -0.048145 0.032567 -1.478334 0.1397 
MOSTCOMP 0.077881 0.008655 8.998841 0.0000 
HIGHLYCOMP 0.048714 0.007093 6.867931 0.0000 
VERYCOMP 0.024356 0.006544 3.721679 0.0002 
COMP -0.002344 0.005860 -0.399920 0.6893 
SPECIAL -0.002033 0.011726 -0.173368 0.8624 
WEST 0.009874 0.007970 1.238951 0.2157 
MIDWEST -0.019701 0.005877 -3.352486 0.0008 
SOUTH -0.027613 0.004601 -6.002163 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.221337    Mean dependent var 4.765603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.206700    S.D. dependent var 0.065475 
S.E. of regression 0.058317    Akaike info criterion -2.826399 
Sum squared resid 2.713861    Schwarz criterion -2.733977 
Log likelihood 1166.344    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.790924 
F-statistic 15.12222    Durbin-Watson stat 1.723564 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 20.48921 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Table 3: Regression output with the average of the minimum and maximum incomes as 
dependent variable  
 
Dependent Variable: AVGINC1   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/24/14   Time: 12:54   
Sample: 1 848    
Included observations: 813   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 65417.37 2366.627 27.64160 0.0000 
STUFACR -37.70554 81.23517 -0.464153 0.6427 
EFYTOTLT_EF2012A_ 0.010654 0.015794 0.674562 0.5001 
NETTUITION 0.057921 0.021737 2.664622 0.0079 
GRADRATE1 -843.1427 4636.768 -0.181838 0.8558 
PROFIT -660.8280 5396.837 -0.122447 0.9026 
PUBLIC 194.9662 871.2725 0.223772 0.8230 
TYPE -2565.374 5107.033 -0.502322 0.6156 
MOSTCOMP 14766.15 2220.958 6.648549 0.0000 
HIGHLYCOMP 9301.127 2045.947 4.546123 0.0000 
VERYCOMP 5340.205 2127.072 2.510589 0.0123 
COMP 1553.836 1955.885 0.794442 0.4272 
LESSCOMP 1206.147 2182.072 0.552753 0.5806 
NONCOMP 2419.818 2359.344 1.025632 0.3054 
WEST 2885.546 1475.129 1.956132 0.0508 
MIDWEST -3183.606 731.9400 -4.349545 0.0000 
SOUTH -4393.630 728.7645 -6.028875 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.266838    Mean dependent var 68173.36 
Adjusted R-squared 0.252101    S.D. dependent var 10301.66 
S.E. of regression 8908.998    Akaike info criterion 21.04820 
Sum squared resid 6.32E+10    Schwarz criterion 21.14649 
Log likelihood -8539.093    Hannan-Quinn criter. 21.08593 
F-statistic 18.10676    Durbin-Watson stat 1.737143 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 21.46703 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 4: Regression with interaction between WEST and NETTUITION 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: AVGINC2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/02/14   Time: 19:30   
Sample: 1 848    
Included observations: 814   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.755303 0.011720 405.7457 0.0000 
STUFACR 0.000793 0.000402 1.973803 0.0487 
EFYTOTLT_EF2012A_ 9.62E-08 1.02E-07 0.944568 0.3452 
NETTUITION 5.60E-07 1.37E-07 4.076432 0.0001 
GRADRATE1 -0.046300 0.031723 -1.459520 0.1448 
PROFIT 0.010782 0.046714 0.230800 0.8175 
PUBLIC 0.001099 0.005634 0.195041 0.8454 
TYPE -0.016628 0.050379 -0.330056 0.7414 
MOSTCOMP 0.072083 0.011173 6.451627 0.0000 
HIGHLYCOMP 0.042011 0.009733 4.316205 0.0000 
VERYCOMP 0.017990 0.009256 1.943710 0.0523 
COMP -0.007644 0.008615 -0.887299 0.3752 
LESSCOMP -0.007553 0.010011 -0.754471 0.4508 
SPECIAL -0.009620 0.012102 -0.794897 0.4269 
WEST -0.024944 0.041439 -0.601962 0.5474 
MIDWEST -0.019976 0.005907 -3.381804 0.0008 
SOUTH -0.028519 0.004640 -6.145925 0.0000 
WEST*NETTUITION 2.88E-06 3.01E-06 0.955455 0.3396 
     
     R-squared 0.230177    Mean dependent var 4.765603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.213737    S.D. dependent var 0.065475 
S.E. of regression 0.058057    Akaike info criterion -2.832903 
Sum squared resid 2.683049    Schwarz criterion -2.728929 
Log likelihood 1170.992    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.792994 
F-statistic 14.00027    Durbin-Watson stat 1.717855 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 18.85550 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 5: Regression with interaction between MIDWEST and NETTUITION 
 
Dependent Variable: AVGINC2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/02/14   Time: 19:32   
Sample: 1 848    
Included observations: 814   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.755693 0.011783 403.6095 0.0000 
STUFACR 0.000746 0.000381 1.955835 0.0508 
EFYTOTLT_EF2012A_ 5.76E-08 9.53E-08 0.603936 0.5461 
NETTUITION 6.77E-07 2.50E-07 2.710172 0.0069 
GRADRATE1 -0.047545 0.032247 -1.474393 0.1408 
PROFIT 0.042536 0.034232 1.242590 0.2144 
PUBLIC 0.000788 0.005621 0.140166 0.8886 
TYPE -0.054498 0.033177 -1.642626 0.1009 
MOSTCOMP 0.071386 0.011083 6.441151 0.0000 
HIGHLYCOMP 0.042271 0.009781 4.321767 0.0000 
VERYCOMP 0.017921 0.009284 1.930363 0.0539 
COMP -0.008791 0.008774 -1.002034 0.3166 
LESSCOMP -0.008632 0.009950 -0.867586 0.3859 
SPECIAL -0.008402 0.013662 -0.614996 0.5387 
WEST 0.009954 0.007974 1.248271 0.2123 
MIDWEST -0.019125 0.012592 -1.518780 0.1292 
SOUTH -0.027643 0.004648 -5.947036 0.0000 
MIDWEST*NETTUITION -4.50E-08 8.67E-07 -0.051917 0.9586 
     
     R-squared 0.221701    Mean dependent var 4.765603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.205079    S.D. dependent var 0.065475 
S.E. of regression 0.058376    Akaike info criterion -2.821952 
Sum squared resid 2.712593    Schwarz criterion -2.717978 
Log likelihood 1166.535    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.782043 
F-statistic 13.33781    Durbin-Watson stat 1.725473 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 18.15247 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6: Regression with interaction between SOUTH and NETTUITION 
 
Dependent Variable: AVGINC2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/02/14   Time: 12:18   
Sample: 1 848    
Included observations: 814   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.755831 0.011750 404.7459 0.0000 
STUFACR 0.000757 0.000379 1.996662 0.0462 
EFYTOTLT_EF2012A_ 5.47E-08 9.47E-08 0.578017 0.5634 
NETTUITION 6.62E-07 2.51E-07 2.636709 0.0085 
GRADRATE1 -0.047116 0.032574 -1.446400 0.1485 
PROFIT 0.042866 0.034179 1.254138 0.2102 
PUBLIC 0.000735 0.005616 0.130798 0.8960 
TYPE -0.054889 0.033125 -1.657012 0.0979 
MOSTCOMP 0.071147 0.011162 6.374116 0.0000 
HIGHLYCOMP 0.041904 0.009822 4.266393 0.0000 
VERYCOMP 0.017739 0.009289 1.909677 0.0565 
COMP -0.008897 0.008710 -1.021504 0.3073 
LESSCOMP -0.008625 0.009956 -0.866400 0.3865 
SPECIAL -0.008515 0.013534 -0.629175 0.5294 
WEST 0.009935 0.007975 1.245807 0.2132 
MIDWEST -0.019685 0.005897 -3.337871 0.0009 
SOUTH -0.029270 0.007474 -3.916182 0.0001 
SOUTH*NETTUITION 1.62E-07 5.58E-07 0.290376 0.7716 
     
     R-squared 0.221743    Mean dependent var 4.765603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.205122    S.D. dependent var 0.065475 
S.E. of regression 0.058375    Akaike info criterion -2.822007 
Sum squared resid 2.712444    Schwarz criterion -2.718033 
Log likelihood 1166.557    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.782098 
F-statistic 13.34111    Durbin-Watson stat 1.726214 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 18.82114 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 7: Regression run for the joint F-test 
 
Dependent Variable: AVGINC2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/02/14   Time: 14:10   
Sample: 1 848    
Included observations: 814   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.758652 0.015698 303.1314 0.0000 
STUFACR 0.000699 0.000526 1.329161 0.1842 
GRADRATE1 -0.046405 0.034908 -1.329364 0.1841 
PROFIT -0.004871 0.021941 -0.222001 0.8244 
PUBLIC 0.000484 0.004977 0.097248 0.9226 
MOSTCOMP 0.077077 0.014561 5.293434 0.0000 
HIGHLYCOMP 0.051335 0.013852 3.706068 0.0002 
VERYCOMP 0.025597 0.012985 1.971326 0.0490 
COMP -0.002930 0.012265 -0.238911 0.8112 
LESSCOMP -0.004077 0.013852 -0.294293 0.7686 
SPECIAL 0.003189 0.020992 0.151937 0.8793 
WEST 0.009345 0.006831 1.367948 0.1717 
MIDWEST -0.020097 0.005697 -3.527373 0.0004 
SOUTH -0.028869 0.005436 -5.311015 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.208968    Mean dependent var 4.765603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.196113    S.D. dependent var 0.065475 
S.E. of regression 0.058704    Akaike info criterion -2.815553 
Sum squared resid 2.756971    Schwarz criterion -2.734684 
Log likelihood 1159.930    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.784512 
F-statistic 16.25667    Durbin-Watson stat 1.705989 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date: 04/01/14   Time: 15:48
Sample: 1 848
AVGINC2 STUFACR EFYTOTLT_E... GRADRATE1 PROFIT PUBLIC TYPE MOSTCOMP HIGHLYCOM... VERYCOMP COMP LESSCOMP SPECIAL WEST MIDWEST SOUTH
 Mean  4.765603  15.39926  8669.767  0.177484  0.015971  0.438575  0.018428  0.089681  0.103194  0.191646  0.472973  0.081081  0.014742  0.138821  0.222359  0.276413
 Median  4.765156  15.00000  4764.500  0.179232  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 Maximum  5.213017  82.00000  359464.0  0.932203  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000
 Minimum  4.162707  6.000000  95.00000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 Std. Dev.  0.065475  5.391584  15908.76  0.069085  0.125438  0.496518  0.134574  0.285899  0.304399  0.393838  0.499576  0.273127  0.120593  0.345972  0.416087  0.447498
 Skewness -2.062374  3.234052  14.52113  1.352009  7.722151  0.247576  7.161385  2.872142  2.608744  1.566854  0.108266  3.069457  8.052844  2.089196  1.335357  0.999891
 Kurtosis  26.65727  33.51470  300.9028  19.74133  60.63161  1.061294  52.28544  9.249200  7.805545  3.455031  1.011722  10.42157  65.84830  5.364738  2.783178  1.999781
 Jarque-Bera  19559.06  33000.35  3038579.  9753.884  120740.9  135.7941  89343.16  2443.672  1706.532  340.0884  135.6713  3146.312  142765.5  781.8110  243.5122  169.5685
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 Sum  3879.201  12535.00  7057190.  144.4720  13.00000  357.0000  15.00000  73.00000  84.00000  156.0000  385.0000  66.00000  12.00000  113.0000  181.0000  225.0000
 Sum Sq. Dev.  3.485283  23633.24  2.06E+11  3.880280  12.79238  200.4287  14.72359  66.45332  75.33170  126.1032  202.9054  60.64865  11.82310  97.31327  140.7531  162.8071
 Observations  814  814  814  814  814  814  814  814  814  814  814  814  814  814  814  814
Date: 04/01/14   Time: 16:13
Sample: 1 848
AVGINC1 STUFACR EFYTOTLT_E... GRADRATE1 PROFIT PUBLIC TYPE MOSTCOMP HIGHLYCOM... VERYCOMP COMP LESSCOMP SPECIAL WEST MIDWEST SOUTH
 Mean  68189.93  15.38235  8650.862  0.177351  0.015931  0.437500  0.019608  0.089461  0.102941  0.191176  0.473039  0.080882  0.014706  0.138480  0.223039  0.275735
 Median  67143.00  15.00000  4746.000  0.179232  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 Maximum  196246.0  82.00000  359464.0  0.932203  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000
 Minimum  30201.00  6.000000  95.00000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 Std. Dev.  10286.71  5.397194  15893.86  0.069322  0.125287  0.496383  0.138733  0.285583  0.304068  0.393469  0.499579  0.272822  0.120447  0.345615  0.416540  0.447158
 Skewness  2.735121  3.218317  14.52952  1.321281  7.732103  0.251976  6.929646  2.876862  2.613243  1.570711  0.108000  3.074351  8.063183  2.093318  1.330632  1.003682
 Kurtosis  32.56971  33.34571  301.3596  19.48929  60.78542  1.063492  49.02000  9.276333  7.829040  3.467133  1.011664  10.45164  66.01493  5.381979  2.770583  2.007377
 Jarque-Bera  30745.91  32717.94  3055339.  9481.916  121662.1  136.1371  78537.29  2464.921  1721.617  342.9493  136.0046  3173.337  143852.0  788.8590  242.5887  170.5035
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000
 Sum  55642980  12552.00  7059103.  144.7185  13.00000  357.0000  16.00000  73.00000  84.00000  156.0000  386.0000  66.00000  12.00000  113.0000  182.0000  225.0000
 Sum Sq. Dev.  8.62E+10  23740.71  2.06E+11  3.916531  12.79289  200.8125  15.68627  66.46936  75.35294  126.1765  203.4069  60.66176  11.82353  97.35172  141.4069  162.9596
 Observations  816  816  816  816  816  816  816  816  816  816  816  816  816  816  816  816
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Table 9: Park test for student-to-faculty ratio 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RESID^2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/02/14   Time: 14:26   
Sample: 1 848    
Included observations: 814   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -6.836844 0.247308 -27.64510 0.0000 
STUFACR -0.054883 0.015159 -3.620571 0.0003 
     
     R-squared 0.015887    Mean dependent var -7.681995 
Adjusted R-squared 0.014675    S.D. dependent var 2.347628 
S.E. of regression 2.330338    Akaike info criterion 4.532358 
Sum squared resid 4409.546    Schwarz criterion 4.543911 
Log likelihood -1842.670    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.536792 
F-statistic 13.10854    Durbin-Watson stat 1.834428 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000312    
     
     
 
 
 
Table 10: Park test output for enrollment 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(RESID^2)   
Method: Least Squares    
Date: 04/02/14   Time: 14:27    
Sample: 1 848     
Included observations: 814    
      
      Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
      
      C 0.242712 0.093787 2.587896 0.0098  
EFYTOTLT_EF2012A_ 3.66E-06 5.18E-06 0.705815 0.4805  
      
      R-squared 0.000613    Mean dependent var 0.274404  
Adjusted R-squared -0.000618    S.D. dependent var 2.348514  
S.E. of regression 2.349239    Akaike info criterion 4.548514  
Sum squared resid 4481.367    Schwarz criterion 4.560067  
Log likelihood -1849.245    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.552949  
F-statistic 0.498175    Durbin-Watson stat 1.931414  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.480505     
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Table 11: The White Test 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 0.370848    Prob. F(67,746) 1.0000 
Obs*R-squared 26.23775    Prob. Chi-Square(67) 1.0000 
Scaled explained SS 448.7337    Prob. Chi-Square(67) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/02/14   Time: 14:37   
Sample: 1 848    
Included observations: 814   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.004247 0.025599 0.165907 0.8683 
STUFACR^2 -1.98E-05 2.25E-05 -0.881984 0.3781 
STUFACR*GRADRATE1 -0.002348 0.004415 -0.531928 0.5949 
STUFACR*PROFIT 0.000916 0.001475 0.620698 0.5350 
STUFACR*PUBLIC -0.000626 0.000563 -1.111467 0.2667 
STUFACR*MOSTCOMP -2.37E-05 0.001623 -0.014584 0.9884 
STUFACR*HIGHLYCOMP 0.000590 0.001513 0.390265 0.6965 
STUFACR*VERYCOMP 0.000846 0.001157 0.731630 0.4646 
STUFACR*COMP 0.000247 0.000986 0.250969 0.8019 
STUFACR*LESSCOMP 0.000683 0.001148 0.595081 0.5520 
STUFACR*SPECIAL -0.000392 0.002109 -0.185755 0.8527 
STUFACR*WEST 0.000491 0.000760 0.646077 0.5184 
STUFACR*MIDWEST 4.48E-05 0.000721 0.062063 0.9505 
STUFACR*SOUTH 0.000566 0.000751 0.753440 0.4514 
STUFACR 0.000485 0.001465 0.331236 0.7406 
GRADRATE1^2 -0.049427 0.064315 -0.768521 0.4424 
GRADRATE1*PROFIT -0.101041 0.255788 -0.395019 0.6929 
GRADRATE1*PUBLIC 0.058953 0.037293 1.580789 0.1144 
GRADRATE1*MOSTCOMP 0.045246 0.118017 0.383382 0.7015 
GRADRATE1*HIGHLYCOMP 0.022686 0.104318 0.217469 0.8279 
GRADRATE1*VERYCOMP 0.020846 0.087404 0.238500 0.8116 
GRADRATE1*COMP 0.054492 0.082127 0.663510 0.5072 
GRADRATE1*LESSCOMP 0.032500 0.091538 0.355041 0.7227 
GRADRATE1*SPECIAL 0.006981 0.172773 0.040405 0.9678 
GRADRATE1*WEST 0.059111 0.051883 1.139302 0.2549 
GRADRATE1*MIDWEST -0.039906 0.040197 -0.992775 0.3211 
GRADRATE1*SOUTH -0.010786 0.036486 -0.295627 0.7676 
GRADRATE1 0.004984 0.098907 0.050390 0.9598 
PROFIT^2 -0.015524 0.032902 -0.471841 0.6372 
PROFIT*WEST -0.002035 0.024488 -0.083100 0.9338 
PROFIT*MIDWEST -0.013393 0.035185 -0.380655 0.7036 
PROFIT*SOUTH -0.010639 0.024778 -0.429379 0.6678 
PUBLIC^2 0.003151 0.015919 0.197942 0.8431 
PUBLIC*MOSTCOMP -0.000550 0.015549 -0.035385 0.9718 
PUBLIC*HIGHLYCOMP -0.007958 0.013788 -0.577223 0.5640 
PUBLIC*VERYCOMP -0.009912 0.012207 -0.811971 0.4171 
PUBLIC*COMP -0.003564 0.011299 -0.315375 0.7526 
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PUBLIC*LESSCOMP -0.003895 0.012521 -0.311087 0.7558 
PUBLIC*SPECIAL -0.010964 0.021945 -0.499594 0.6175 
PUBLIC*WEST 0.002979 0.006500 0.458331 0.6468 
PUBLIC*MIDWEST 0.003521 0.005061 0.695715 0.4868 
PUBLIC*SOUTH 0.000752 0.005106 0.147194 0.8830 
MOSTCOMP^2 -0.008353 0.033099 -0.252358 0.8008 
MOSTCOMP*WEST -0.008465 0.017438 -0.485438 0.6275 
MOSTCOMP*MIDWEST 0.006908 0.018988 0.363803 0.7161 
MOSTCOMP*SOUTH 0.002702 0.014063 0.192117 0.8477 
HIGHLYCOMP^2 -0.008828 0.031838 -0.277268 0.7817 
HIGHLYCOMP*WEST -0.009549 0.017004 -0.561589 0.5746 
HIGHLYCOMP*MIDWEST 0.007541 0.016760 0.449967 0.6529 
HIGHLYCOMP*SOUTH 0.001417 0.012403 0.114208 0.9091 
VERYCOMP^2 -0.011191 0.024916 -0.449162 0.6534 
VERYCOMP*WEST -0.001397 0.015597 -0.089546 0.9287 
VERYCOMP*MIDWEST 0.005364 0.015911 0.337120 0.7361 
VERYCOMP*SOUTH 0.000701 0.011808 0.059394 0.9527 
COMP^2 -0.007781 0.022662 -0.343356 0.7314 
COMP*WEST -0.000274 0.014812 -0.018518 0.9852 
COMP*MIDWEST 0.006524 0.015357 0.424797 0.6711 
COMP*SOUTH -0.002735 0.011106 -0.246291 0.8055 
LESSCOMP^2 -0.011961 0.026058 -0.459017 0.6464 
LESSCOMP*WEST -0.006007 0.016742 -0.358782 0.7199 
LESSCOMP*MIDWEST 0.000303 0.017132 0.017668 0.9859 
LESSCOMP*SOUTH -0.002036 0.012500 -0.162915 0.8706 
SPECIAL^2 0.003581 0.047130 0.075991 0.9394 
SPECIAL*WEST 0.003063 0.034039 0.089974 0.9283 
SPECIAL*MIDWEST 0.001755 0.024935 0.070362 0.9439 
WEST^2 -0.011556 0.019948 -0.579315 0.5626 
MIDWEST^2 0.000163 0.019890 0.008193 0.9935 
SOUTH^2 -0.006941 0.017130 -0.405198 0.6854 
     
     R-squared 0.032233    Mean dependent var 0.003387 
Adjusted R-squared -0.054684    S.D. dependent var 0.020168 
S.E. of regression 0.020712    Akaike info criterion -4.836391 
Sum squared resid 0.320016    Schwarz criterion -4.443599 
Log likelihood 2036.411    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.685622 
F-statistic 0.370848    Durbin-Watson stat 2.078434 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999999    
     
     
 
Table 12: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
AVGINC2 STUFACR EFYTOTLT_EF2012A_GRADRATE1NETTUITIONPROFIT PUBLIC TYPE MOSTCOMPHIGHLYCOMPVERYCOMPCOMP LESSCOMPSPECIAL WEST MIDWEST SOUTH
AVGINC2 1 -0.10558 0.042724 0.083557 0.16277 -0.00039 -0.08404 -0.00995 0.29822 0.168028 0.075932 -0.27088 -0.08702 -0.01055 0.145967 -0.10391 -0.1993
STUFACR -0.10558 1 0.41611 -0.38065 -0.12474 0.350664 0.450495 0.366191 -0.34643 -0.10683 -0.07026 0.157677 0.114139 -0.09609 0.183238 -0.00837 0.158633
EFYTOTLT_EF2012A_0.042724 0.41611 1 -0.21765 -0.01734 0.393729 0.219134 0.380105 -0.0564 0.025242 -0.00519 -0.06741 -0.02172 -0.04248 0.19134 -0.05413 0.033047
GRADRATE1 0.083557 -0.38065 -0.21765 1 0.073962 -0.28315 -0.22067 -0.31048 0.239537 0.177521 0.101119 -0.15468 -0.08243 -0.01006 -0.17052 -0.06117 -0.04986
NETTUITION 0.16277 -0.12474 -0.01734 0.073962 1 -0.05716 -0.14322 -0.07649 0.003089 0.132332 0.094122 -0.09304 -0.09264 0.107524 0.004093 0.014785 -0.1136
PROFIT -0.00039 0.350664 0.393729 -0.28315 -0.05716 1 -0.1126 0.929786 -0.03999 -0.04322 -0.06203 -0.12069 -0.03784 -0.01558 0.090564 -0.02099 0.00891
PUBLIC -0.08404 0.450495 0.219134 -0.22067 -0.14322 -0.1126 1 -0.1211 -0.21676 -0.07195 -0.04037 0.144541 0.118401 -0.06703 0.067601 -0.03204 0.156778
TYPE -0.00995 0.366191 0.380105 -0.31048 -0.07649 0.929786 -0.1211 1 -0.04301 -0.04648 -0.06672 -0.1298 -0.0407 -0.01676 0.129918 -0.02933 -0.00299
MOSTCOMP 0.29822 -0.34643 -0.0564 0.239537 0.003089 -0.03999 -0.21676 -0.04301 1 -0.10647 -0.15283 -0.29734 -0.09323 -0.03839 0.01077 -0.11614 -0.09785
HIGHLYCOMP 0.168028 -0.10683 0.025242 0.177521 0.132332 -0.04322 -0.07195 -0.04648 -0.10647 1 -0.16517 -0.32135 -0.10076 -0.04149 -0.03108 0.003126 0.007055
VERYCOMP 0.075932 -0.07026 -0.00519 0.101119 0.094122 -0.06203 -0.04037 -0.06672 -0.15283 -0.16517 1 -0.46127 -0.14463 -0.05956 0.030187 0.039872 -0.06365
COMP -0.27088 0.157677 -0.06741 -0.15468 -0.09304 -0.12069 0.144541 -0.1298 -0.29734 -0.32135 -0.46127 1 -0.2814 -0.11588 -0.05299 0.079244 0.052715
LESSCOMP -0.08702 0.114139 -0.02172 -0.08243 -0.09264 -0.03784 0.118401 -0.0407 -0.09323 -0.10076 -0.14463 -0.2814 1 -0.03634 0.010906 -0.03978 0.078061
SPECIAL -0.01055 -0.09609 -0.04248 -0.01006 0.107524 -0.01558 -0.06703 -0.01676 -0.03839 -0.04149 -0.05956 -0.11588 -0.03634 1 0.009851 -0.01638 -0.0756
WEST 0.145967 0.183238 0.19134 -0.17052 0.004093 0.090564 0.067601 0.129918 0.01077 -0.03108 0.030187 -0.05299 0.010906 0.009851 1 -0.21469 -0.24815
MIDWEST -0.10391 -0.00837 -0.05413 -0.06117 0.014785 -0.02099 -0.03204 -0.02933 -0.11614 0.003126 0.039872 0.079244 -0.03978 -0.01638 -0.21469 1 -0.3305
SOUTH -0.1993 0.158633 0.033047 -0.04986 -0.1136 0.00891 0.156778 -0.00299 -0.09785 0.007055 -0.06365 0.052715 0.078061 -0.0756 -0.24815 -0.3305 1
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Table 13: VIF 
 
Variable VIF 
STUFACR 1.010509 
EFYTOTLT_EF2012A_ 1.001865 
GRADRATE1 1.006157 
NETTUITION 1.028789 
PROFIT 1.000001 
PUBLIC 1.007846 
TYPE 1.00011 
MOSTCOMP 1.103429 
HIGHLYCOMP 1.028483 
VERYCOMP 1.005454 
COMP 1.080504 
LESSCOMP 1.00764 
SPECIAL 1.000117 
WEST 1.02086 
MIDWEST 1.011756 
SOUTH 1.040336 
 
Table 14: The final regression with all statistically insignificant variables, excluding 
TYPE, removed 
 
Dependent Variable: AVGINC2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/07/14   Time: 10:45   
Sample: 1 848    
Included observations: 814   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.746707 0.009376 506.2520 0.0000 
STUFACR 0.000871 0.000329 2.644685 0.0083 
NETTUITION 6.78E-07 2.40E-07 2.822419 0.0049 
GRADRATE1 -0.050726 0.030475 -1.664489 0.0964 
TYPE -0.009129 0.014664 -0.622528 0.5338 
MOSTCOMP 0.080340 0.007687 10.45077 0.0000 
HIGHLYCOMP 0.051002 0.005686 8.968968 0.0000 
VERYCOMP 0.026497 0.005211 5.085257 0.0000 
WEST 0.009630 0.007853 1.226227 0.2205 
MIDWEST -0.019844 0.005859 -3.387079 0.0007 
SOUTH -0.027430 0.004602 -5.960978 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.220038    Mean dependent var 4.765603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.210325    S.D. dependent var 0.065475 
S.E. of regression 0.058183    Akaike info criterion -2.837017 
Sum squared resid 2.718389    Schwarz criterion -2.773477 
Log likelihood 1165.666    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.812628 
F-statistic 22.65370    Durbin-Watson stat 1.716265 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 29.92661 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Dependent Variable: AVGINC2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/07/14   Time: 10:45   
Sample: 1 848    
Included observations: 814   
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.746707 0.009376 506.2520 0.0000 
STUFACR 0.000871 0.000329 2.644685 0.0083 
NETTUITION 6.78E-07 2.40E-07 2.822419 0.0049 
GRADRATE1 -0.050726 0.030475 -1.664489 0.0964 
TYPE -0.009129 0.014664 -0.622528 0.5338 
MOSTCOMP 0.080340 0.007687 10.45077 0.0000 
HIGHLYCOMP 0.051002 0.005686 8.968968 0.0000 
VERYCOMP 0.026497 0.005211 5.085257 0.0000 
WEST 0.009630 0.007853 1.226227 0.2205 
MIDWEST -0.019844 0.005859 -3.387079 0.0007 
SOUTH -0.027430 0.004602 -5.960978 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.220038    Mean dependent var 4.765603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.210325    S.D. dependent var 0.065475 
S.E. of regression 0.058183    Akaike info criterion -2.837017 
Sum squared resid 2.718389    Schwarz criterion -2.773477 
Log likelihood 1165.666    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.812628 
F-statistic 22.65370    Durbin-Watson stat 1.716265 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Wald F-statistic 29.92661 
Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
    
Table 15: Net Present Value Calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Present value of benefits of attending a traditional university versus an online university
C = β 2565.37
i1 8.50% PV(i1) 30,180.12$             
i2 7.58% PV(i2) 33,845.52$             
Present Value of the costs of the benefits of switching
Time 0 1 2 3 4
Cash Flow 6256.1947 6256.195 6256.195 6256.195
PV 5766.078083 5314.358 4898.026 4514.309
PV(Costs, i1) 20,492.77$            
Time 0 1 2 3 4
Cash Flow 6256.19472 6256.195 6256.195 6256.195
PV 5815.415945 5405.692 5024.835 4670.812
PV(Costs, i2) 20,916.76$             
NPV(Attending traditional vs. online university)
w/ i1 9,687.35$   
w/ i2 12,928.77$ 
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Figure 1:  Scatter plot of the errors versus STUFACR 
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Figure 2: Scatter plot of the errors versus ENROLLMENT 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, the cost of attending college has increased dramatically, while 
obtaining a post-secondary degree has simultaneously become more of a necessity for the 
majority of jobs available in the economy. As the rising costs of education have deterred 
massive numbers of students from seeking a college degree, finding a cost-effective 
alternative to a traditional university has become an increasingly important issue in order 
to continue to promote and to facilitate economic growth.   
In the coming years, the White House predicts that employment in jobs requiring 
education beyond a high school diploma will grow more rapidly than employment in jobs 
that do not.
1
 In response to the shortage of available affordable colleges, the Obama 
Administration proposed the “Race to the Top” initiative to make college more affordable 
for students nationwide so that America will be the leader in the proportion of college 
                                                     
1
 "Higher Education." The White House. The White House, n.d. Web. 03 Apr. 2014. 
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graduates by 2020.  According to the basic theory of human capital model, increasing the 
level of investment in higher education has the potential to facilitate economic growth, as 
increases in human capital can greatly affect economic growth.  As the cost of education 
has grown to a level that discourages Americans from attending college, finding a viable 
way to increase the number of college graduates and participants has the potential to help 
promote economic growth.   
Online universities offer a wide variety of programs and majors at a much lower 
cost than that of a traditional university.  These schools can therefore provide an 
opportunity for someone who cannot afford a traditional university in this harsh 
economic climate to receive a college education. However, many employers are hesitant 
to accept online universities as a credible and equivalent alternative to a traditional 
university system, possibly due a general mistrust of the program as a result of a 
difference in learning experiences of online versus an in-person class, or an overall lack 
of knowledge about the various programs offered. 
Today, many measure the value their college education in dollars, by comparing 
their salary with other recent, employed college graduates.  As income has recently 
become one of the most popular methods for measuring the value of a college degree, this 
study seeks to determine whether or not an online university student can achieve the same 
employment outcomes as a traditional university student.  This paper focuses on the 
effect college type has on average income by comparing the average income of online 
university students and traditional university students. An econometric model will be 
used in order to analyze the effect college type, defined as an online university or 
traditional university, has on average salary of recent graduates.  The regression 
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compares the average of the logarithm of the maximum and minimum salaries for each 
institution included in the sample.  While most previous literature uses data by student, 
this model provides a comparison the average income of graduates from of each 
institution rather than a comparison of the incomes of individual students.  
The independent variables included in the regression describe college quality, 
selectivity, type, student ability, and region.  The regression incorporates multiple proxies 
specifically for college quality, such as student to faculty ratio and net tuition, which are 
similar to the proxies employed by Black and Smith (2006).   This model uses the 
variable describing graduation rate as a proxy for both college quality and student ability, 
unlike previous literature, which most often used an average SAT variable to capture 
student ability.   
Understanding the differences and similarities in labor market returns to an 
education earned online versus an education earned in a traditional university system 
would help to establish online universities as a substitute for traditional universities. 
However, the results from the model do not suggest that the effect college type has on 
average income is indistinguishable from zero, meaning there is no statistical difference 
between the average incomes of students who attend online universities versus traditional 
universities were found in the model.  Additionally, all variables describing college type, 
such as whether or not the school is a public versus private institution and for-profit 
versus not-for-profit, were found to be statistically insignificant. Select variables 
describing the level of selectivity the school is categorized as, for example most 
competitive, highly competitive and very competitive schools, on the other hand, have a 
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strong, positive effect on average income, indicating that students who attend more 
selective schools have higher incomes than students who attend less selective schools.   
While the statistical analysis of the regression suggests college type has no effect 
on average income, a calculation of the net present value of attending an online university 
versus a traditional university demonstrates that there are returns to attending a traditional 
university.  Despite higher tuition costs, the net present value of attending a traditional 
university is much greater than the net present value of attending an online university.  
Such a large discrepancy between the two values suggests that while online universities 
may be more cost-effective, in the sense that online universities have lower tuition costs, 
and college type has not statistical impact on income, in the long run, paying higher 
tuition costs pays off over time in terms of increased labor market returns to attending a 
traditional university.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This econometric model expands upon the findings and methods of previous 
studies.  However, every study that is considered in this section neglects to take into 
account online universities as a college type.  Rather than investigating only college 
selectivity or quality, this model specifically looks at college type in two categories: 
online universities and traditional universities. 
The study conducted by Dale and Krueger (2011) sought to examine the 
relationship between the college that students attended and the earnings students reported 
in a follow up survey in order to determine if the “selectivity” of a college affected the 
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amount of money the student will make after graduation.
2
 This study used the College 
and Beyond Survey linked to Detailed Earnings Records from the Social Security 
Administration as data on each of the students within each cohort in order to build an 
econometric model to estimate the return of several college characteristics. Dale and 
Krueger separated students into two different cohorts – one cohort consisted of students 
who entered college in 1989, and the other followed a cohort of students who entered 
college in 1976.
3
  
Dale and Kreuger’s first model attempted to estimate the relationship between 
earnings, school quality, and observable student characteristics, such as high school GPA 
and individual student’s SAT scores.  However, estimating a regression of this kind 
creates a difficulty with the selection, as not all characteristics that lead students to apply 
to selective colleges are available to researchers.
4
  Neglecting to account for ability is a 
major problem because ability is often rewarded in the labor market, so a measure of 
ability should be included within the regression.
5
  The equation used to estimate student’s 
attributes should read as follows: 
  (  )                          
where Q measures college selectivity, X1  measures observable student characteristics, 
and X2 measures unobservable student characteristics.  In this regression,    represents 
the monetary payoff to attending a more selective college.  In previous literature, because 
researchers did not have access to data or did not consider the unobservable student 
characteristics, estimated regressions took the form: 
                                                     
2 Dale, Stacy, and Alan B. Krueger. Estimating the return to college selectivity over the career using 
administrative earnings data. No. w17159. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011. 
3
 Dale and Krueger 
4
 Dale and Krueger 
5
 Dale and Krueger 
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  (  )     
    
      
      
This estimation, even if students randomly selected the college they went to, will yield 
biased coefficients.  The coefficients describing the impact of college selectivity and 
observable student characteristics will not serve as accurate representations of the true 
population parameters.  The bias in the coefficients occurs as a result of the excluded 
variable X2, the variable that describes the unobservable student characteristics.  Thus, 
excluding X2, it is then put into the random error term U such that 
        
where v is uncorrelated with Q1, X1 and X2, and also has a zero mean such that E(u)=0.  
However, U is only uncorrelated with Q1 and X1 if and only if X2 is uncorrelated with the 
observable regressors (Q and X1).  But in this case, X2 is correlated with the observable 
regressors because the unobservable student characteristics are related to the student’s 
observable characteristics.  As such, u is now correlated with the observable regressors as 
X2 is now incorporated into u.  Thus, this omitted variable violated the assumption that 
the random error term is uncorrelated with an estimate of any coefficient.   
The omission of student ability from the regression causes the remaining 
estimated coefficients to be biased, as the student ability is relevant in explaining the 
dependent variable.
6
  The linear projection of X2 onto the other explanatory variables, in 
other words the bias created in the other independent variables, as  
                  
                                                     
6 Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT 
press, 2010. 
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By definition, E( r ) = 0, and the covariance between (  , r) = 0.  Now we can infer the 
probability limit of the OLS estimators by regressing a variable, y, onto    and X1, by 
finding an equation that does satisfy the OLS assumptions. 
  (      )  (      )   (      )   (     ) 
In this case, the error term has zero mean and is uncorrelated with each regressor.  Now 
the probability limit of the OLS estimators from the regression of y can be read as 
       ̂          
When the correlation between X2 and a particular variable, say Q1 is the focus, a common 
assumption is that all of the    – the affect of the bias – in the equation except the 
intercept are coefficient on X2 are zero.  By writing out the effect of the bias, the correct 
sign and magnitude of the bias on the coefficient can be determined.  According to 
Wooldridge, If y > 0, then X2 and Q1 are positively correlated.   In this case, if students 
are not randomly choosing which school they attend, the payoff of attending a selective 
school is biased upwards, because the selectivity of the school attended is correlated 
positively with the student’s unobserved abilities.7  If the coefficients are biased and 
inconsistent, then we cannot make any conclusions about the population, as the estimated 
coefficients no longer provide an accurate portrayal of the population.   
 In order to account for the bias in the regression caused by the omitted variable 
X2, Dale and Kruger included a proxy for the unobserved student characteristics.  The 
proxy must be redundant, or ignorable in the structural equation, and uncorrelated with 
the omitted variable and each of the other regressors.
8
  It is always assumed that a proxy 
satisfies the redundancy condition, however, it does not always satisfy the second 
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property.  If the proxy turns out to be correlated with one or more of the independent 
variables, then the proxy is imperfect.
9
  An OLS with an imperfect proxy still yields 
inconsistent estimated coefficients.  The hope is that the bias on each of the regressors is 
smaller in magnitude than if the proxy was omitted from the linear regression
10
.  In this 
study, Dale and Krueger included the average SAT score of the schools the student 
applied to (AVG) as a proxy for the unobservable student attributes.  AVG is irrelevant in 
explaining wage once the unobserved student characteristics have been controlled for, yet 
AVG must be included in the regression because Dale and Krueger cannot obtain data on 
X2.  By definition, ability and ambition affect wage, thus the average SAT score of the 
schools the student applied to would not matter if true ability or motivation were known.   
However, the concern that AVG does not control for all of the bias remains.  For 
example, using AVG as a selection correction can still yield a biased estimate of    if 
students’ school enrollment decisions are a function of X1 or any other variable not in the 
model.  Previous studies found that students are more prone to matriculate to schools that 
provide more financial aid than others.
11
  In this case, if more selective colleges provide 
more financial aid, the estimated coefficients will be biased upwards, because students 
with higher levels of X2 will attend more selective schools, regardless of the outcomes of 
applications to other colleges.  On the other hand, if less selective schools provide more 
generous financial aid, which would create incentive for students with higher levels of X2 
to attend less selective schools, the bias in the estimated coefficients will be downwards.   
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Dale and Krueger ultimately concluded that attending the most selective college 
to which a student was admitted does not necessarily benefit the student.
12
  Instead, the 
unobserved student characteristics, such as ambition or passion, greatly affect how each 
student performs in the labor market.  Simply relying on the prestige of the college name 
does not automatically generate a higher income for students.  
Their results led to two different conclusions in each model.  In the model that did 
not account for unobserved student characteristics, they found a significant and positive 
effect of the return to college selectivity.
13
  Dale and Krueger analyzed both earnings data 
sets coming from the C&B earnings and the SSA earnings.  With respect to C&B 
earnings, they found that the estimated coefficient on college SAT score/100 in the basic 
model is 0.068 (Table 3)
14
, meaning that attending a school with a 100-point higher SAT 
score is correlated with about 7% higher earnings (Table 3).
15
   Yet when looking at the 
C&B earnings within the self-revelation model, Dale and Krueger found that the 
estimated coefficient on school SAT score was indistinguishable from zero, suggesting 
school selectivity has no significant impact on student future earnings (Table 3).
16
  With 
respect to earnings data collected from the SSA, Dale and Krueger found the estimated 
coefficients on school SAT score ranged from 0.048 to 0.061 – similar to the results with 
the C&B data (Table 3).
17
  However, in the self-revelation model, the estimated 
coefficient on school SAT score was negative at -0.021 to -0.023 and statistically 
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insignificant (Table 3).
18
   For both cohorts and both sources of earnings data, the return 
to college selectivity has a large and positive effect on earnings when unobserved student 
characteristics are not taken into consideration.  However, when unobserved student 
characteristics are taken into account in the self-revelation model, the returns to college 
selectivity fall significantly and are statistically insignificant.
19
   These results imply that 
students do not automatically benefit from attending the most selective college.  Instead, 
students can maximize their benefits by instead choosing a school based on how well the 
school fits with the student’s interests and abilities.20 
The study conducted by Dale and Kruger provides an excellent method for 
accounting for the selection bias due to an omitted variable within the model.  Using the 
average SAT score of the schools the student applied to seems to be the most efficient 
solution to account for bias in the estimated coefficients.  Unfortunately, due to data 
constraints, this exact proxy variable for student ability is not included in this model.  
Online universities do not have an SAT requirement for students to apply and be accepted 
into the school.  As such, online universities do keep a record of any data describing the 
average SAT score of the first-year class.  While Dale and Kreuger’s exact methodology 
cannot be employed in this case, their careful awareness and attention to selection bias 
created by omitted variables is directly applicable to this model.   
In Zhang’s study “Do Measures of College Quality Matter? The Effect of College 
Quality on Graduates’ Earnings,” Zhang examines the relationship between college 
quality and graduates’ earnings.  However, he specifically is interested in the different 
methods of measuring college quality and how changing the method affects the 
                                                     
18
 Dale and Krueger 
19
 Dale and Krueger 
20
 Dale and Krueger 
30 
 
relationship.  Zhang concluded that simply having a single measure of college quality 
leads to misleading results, as higher education institutions are complex, and require 
more than one measure of college quality.
21
   
In order to analyze the differences in the effect of measures of college quality on 
earnings, Zhang utilized an array of quality measures on the same data set, and then 
compared his results to those from previous studies that only used one measure of college 
quality.  Furthermore, his model excludes the characteristics of high-quality institutions, 
such as high-level peers, superior resources, and higher levels of academic and social 
engagement.
22
  For his data, Zhang used the second follow-up survey of the 
Baccalaureate and Beyond study and used the following equation for the OLS regression 
  (  )                                         
where Qij measures the quality of institution j he or she attended, Di measures 
demographic characteristics such as race and ethnicity, Fi measures family background 
(family income or first generation college graduate), Ai measures students’ academic 
background, and Ji captures labor market factors (age, job tenures, and their square 
terms).
23
  In this study, Zhang altered the definition of Qij, but used this same baseline 
model and the same data set to examine the possible differences among the estimates for 
different measures of college quality.   
 Zhang considered three additional measures of college quality: mean SAT scores 
of the entering freshman class, tuition and fees for each institution, and Carnegie 
institutional classifications.   For the baseline model, he used Barron’s ratings as the 
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single measure of college quality.  The results from the OLS regression suggest that 
college quality, when considering only this measure of college quality, have a positive 
and significant impact on graduates’ earnings.  The estimated coefficient of Qij for most 
selective, private institutions was 0.1754 and a significant t-statistic (Table 3).
24
  Meaning 
holding all other independent variables constant, students who attend high-quality, 
private institutions earn about 17% more than students who do not.  This study found 
results that were consistent with Zhang’s findings, as students who attend most 
competitive schools have incomes of about 7% more than students who do not (Table 1).   
 The additional measures of college quality were included in the subsequent 
regressions of the model.  By changing and adding measures of college quality in the 
model, Zhang then manipulates and changes the definition of a high-quality college.
25
  As 
a result of including additional measures, the number of students who attended a high-
quality college increases (Table 5),
26
  so the number of schools that are considered to be 
high-quality with the additional measures increased.  In return, the magnitude of the 
effect school quality has on earnings changes and is now smaller and less significant than 
in the baseline model.  For example, when mean SAT scores of the entering freshmen 
class is included as a measure of college quality, the estimated coefficient for a most 
selective, private institution is now 0.1005 (Table 8).
27
  In other words, a student who 
attends a most selective, private institution earns about 10% more than a student who 
does not. 
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 However, it seems as though using tuition and fees as a measure of college quality 
might not be the best proxy for college quality, as the costs of attending a school may 
fluctuate greatly as a result of variations in costs from external factors, such as 
government block grants and states lending different amounts to schools, and cost of 
living.  Yet in this model, rather than simply using the sticker price of each school, the 
net tuition is taken into account as a way to control for the cost-effectiveness of each 
school and also serve as a potential proxy for school quality.  Higher quality schools may 
be able to afford to lend more aid to students, and therefore may have a lower net tuition 
than others.  Zhang’s choice of using tuition as a measure of college quality could 
potentially be a source of bias in Zhang’s model, as tuition and fees could potentially be 
considered an irrelevant proxy.  Tuition and fees do not seem to be highly correlated 
enough with the unobservable variable, college quality.   
 Yet Zhang makes a solid argument for why a single measure of college quality 
can provide misleading results.  One variable does not serve as an adequate proxy 
variable due to the complexity of the concept of college quality.  Moreover, Zhang 
stresses the importance of clearly defining which variables describe college quality.  As 
seen from this study, depending on how one defines college quality can yield different 
results.  Zhang defined college quality only by four variables.  This study will adopt parts 
of Zhang’s method for choosing more than one measure of college quality.  However, the 
data included in this model is not aggregated at the individual level, and instead is 
aggregated across individual institutions. Furthermore, due to lack of data specifically on 
the online schools, the variables used measures of college quality differ than those in 
Zhang’s study.   
33 
 
 The study conducted by James Monks in 1999 sought to examine differentials in 
earnings across individual and institutional characteristics.  The results from this study 
suggest that students who graduate from more selective schools earn significantly more 
than students who graduate from less selective schools.
28
 
 In this study, Monks built an econometric model to the estimate the returns of 
selectivity, student’s ability, labor market experience, and college type on earnings.   
  (    )                             29 
Where     is the hourly wage,      are individual and time varying labor market 
experiences,      are non-time varying individual characteristics which influence 
earnings,    are college characteristics,    is a normally distributed individual specific 
error component, and      is a normally distributed random error.
30
 
In order to create a model that fully captured the impact on earnings, Monks had 
to account for student ability, as ability can have a major impact on a student’s future 
earnings.  He did so by adding a group of independent variables: each student’s Armed 
Forces Qualifications Test, race, gender, industry, and occupation.  Furthermore, he used 
Barron’s ranking and college classifications as a means to determine college selectivity, 
quality, and type.
31
   However, even though Monks used controls for both the ability and 
college quality in the model, the estimated regression will yield biased estimated 
coefficients due to an omitted variable that would describe the institutions’ and students’ 
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enrollment process, as the process is not a random selection.
32
  In order to account for this 
bias, Monks included variables that described each student’s attributes, such as the 
student’s academic ability and the student’s ability to pay (family income) that may 
influence the enrollment process. 
33
 Unfortunately, this does not perfectly account for the 
enrollment process, so some bias in the estimated coefficients may still remain. 
Due to lack of data on the enrollment process for online universities, this model 
does not control for the enrollment process.  As a result, bias in the estimated coefficients 
still remains and will lead to unreliable results.   Monks simply included other variables 
as a way to partially account for the selection bias created by the enrollment process.  
Monks also attempted to account for variations in earnings as a result of peer effects and 
classroom dynamics of race and gender by performing different and separate regressions 
by race and gender to allow some of the coefficients to vary.
34
   
The evidence from this student suggests that students who graduate from highly 
or most selective schools earn significantly more, about 15% (Table 4)
35
, than graduates 
from less selective institutions.  As student’s move from non-competitive, or less 
competitive institutions to highly or the most competitive institutions, earnings 
significantly increased.  The estimated coefficients describing college type, quality, and 
students’ academic ability were all large, positive and significant.  More specifically, 
students who graduate from private colleges earned about 4.5% (Table 4)
36
 more than 
students who graduated from a public university, while students who graduated from a 
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degree-granting research institution earned about 14% (Table 4)
37
 more than graduates 
from liberal arts colleges.  Also, for every point increase in the AFQT test score, earnings 
increase by 11.1% (Table 4), meaning that a student with greater academic ability – 
measured by an increase in AFQT test score – will earn more than a student with less 
academic ability.
38
  These results strongly suggest a positive and significant relationship 
between college quality and wages, even after controlling for colleges’ characteristics and 
students’ ability.     
The study conducted by Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg (1999), investigates high 
school students’ choice of college type based on individual and family characteristics and 
estimates of the net costs of attendance.
39
 By analyzing the results of the regression, 
Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg were able to determine the effects of college quality on 
wages and earnings and how this effect varies across time.  They found strong, positive 
economic return to attending an elite private institution, and even found some evidence to 
suggest that this premium has increased over time.
40
 
In order to estimate the effects of college type, Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg 
regressed the logarithm of individual student’s earnings or hourly wage on the student’s 
characteristics and a set of college characteristics.
41
  College quality was measured with 
proxied indicators of selectivity of the undergraduate body, including average SAT scores 
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of the entering freshmen, and resource measures such as instructional expenditures per 
student, library size, and faculty per student.
42
 
Furthermore, they attempted to control for the systematic selection of college type 
on the basis of the expected labor market payoff.  Meaning that although the tuition costs 
of attending a highly-selective, private institution are much greater than that of a non-
selective, public institutions, students will choose to attend the highly-selective school 
based on their expectations of labor market returns.  However, the problem is that if 
students are investing in college quality solely on the basis of expected returns, college 
type cannot be treated as an exogenous determinant of earnings.
43
 
Their results show clear patterns across their data cohorts, suggesting that students 
with higher family incomes and more highly educated parents are more likely to attend 
higher-quality colleges.
44
  Furthermore, they found that those with greater academic 
talent predominate at high-quality schools, and financial aid is about twice as high for 
students attending private institutions than public (Table 1).
45
 Interestingly, their results 
suggest that not only were there significant and positive returns to attending an elite 
college, but also these returns increased over time from 19% to 39% increases in annual 
earnings (Table 2).
46
   
Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg note a potential bias in the estimated coefficient 
caused by the differences in financial aid given out by each school.  They also attempted 
to control for the college selection process by estimating a reduced-form college choice 
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multinominal logit model.
47
  In this model, they added two variables to proxy for the 
likelihood of being admitted to a particular institution: the availability of college 
openings and the students test score difference.
48
  In this model, the methodology 
employed by Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg may not be applicable since online colleges 
technically have no limit to the number of college openings available as well as online 
universities do not keep SAT score data because they do not have testing requirements.  
The college selection process in this model is quite different than if the model was 
focusing at traditional institutions.  Moreover, Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg specifically 
added in the conclusion of the paper that although their analysis suggests the return to 
elite private colleges increased significantly for the 1980s cohorts as compared to the 
1972 cohort, they did not in any way attempt to determine the cause of this change.
49
   
Black and Smith (2006) build upon previous studies, such as Zhang (2005) and 
Dale and Kreuger (2002) that analyze the effects of college quality on wages.
50
  Similar 
to the methodology employed by Zhang (2005), Black and Smith question the common 
practice of using a single proxy of college quality and instead examine the effect by using 
multiple proxies for quality.  Black and Smith claim that adopting one measure of quality 
will underestimate the effect college type has on wages.
51
  Existing literature most 
commonly employs a “one-factor model,” in which one college quality measure is 
included – usually a measure of selectivity – and included in outcome equations with 
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covariates. 
52
 Most studies follow the methods of Heckman and Robb (1985), and assume 
“selection on observables” and hope that by including a sufficiently rich X with some 
measure of individual ability will control for the non-random matching of students and 
colleges.
53
 However, Black and Smith, for the purposes of their study, assume selection 
on observables and place their attention on issues of interpreting the parameters used to 
capture college quality.
54
 
Black and Smith built an econometric model to estimate the wage effect of 
college quality 
  (   )              
      
where   (   ) is the natural logarithm of the wage rate of the ith person attending the jth 
college, Xi is a series of covariates, Si is the number of years of schooling and Qij is the 
latent quality variables, and an error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
regressors.
55
  For the latent college quality variables, Black and Smith included each 
college’s faculty-student ratio, rejection rate, freshmen retention rate, mean SAT score 
and mean faculty salaries. This model will adopt the use of faculty-student ratio as a 
means to measure college quality.  Yet as a result of online universities neglecting to 
keep SAT score information, lack of retention and rejection rates, the remaining measures 
of college quality used by Black and Smith (2006) will not be included in the regression.   
 Black and Smith found none of the estimated coefficients on the latent quality 
variables to be statistically different from zero, and ultimately failed to model this scale 
factor.
56
  However, their estimators suggest a downward bias on quality of about 20% 
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relative to only using an SAT variable as a proxy for quality.
57
  Furthermore, their results 
suggest that even though average SAT score is the most reliable or accurate measures of 
college quality, future studies need to consider whether or not this measure varies on the 
same scale as college quality.
58
 
 Most previous literature supports the claim that there are significant and positive 
returns to college selectivity and quality.  Students who attend more selective schools 
earn more than students who attend less selective schools.  Furthermore, most literature 
agrees with the methodology of including more than one measure of college quality, as a 
single measure of quality will inevitably yield biased coefficients.  This model will 
incorporate multiple proxies for college quality, such as student to faculty ratio and net 
tuition.  Unfortunately, due to data availability constraints and this study being based on 
institutional level data, this model will not include the other proxies for quality, similar to 
those used in the study done by Black and Smith (2006).  Previous literature additionally 
stresses the importance of utilizing a proxy variable for student ability within the 
regression in order to attempt to control for the selection bias created by the non-random 
process of college enrollment and ability being rewarded in the labor market.  Most 
studies, specifically in the research conducted by Dale and Krueger (2011), used an 
average SAT variable to proxy for student ability.  Again, due to lack of data on the 
institutional level, an average SAT variable cannot be included in this regression.  
Instead, graduation rate will be used as a proxy for student ability.   
Since online universities are fairly new institutions, previous literature does not 
focus on the wage effect of college type as defined as online versus traditional university.  
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As a result, many of the variables included in previous research to measure college 
quality and student ability are not available or relevant to online universities.  At any rate, 
this paper will adopt parts of previous studies and combine each of their methods in order 
to estimate the labor market returns to college type.   
DATA 
 
As a result of an inability to collect individual level data in time and for online 
universities, this model will estimate the effect of college type on wages on an 
institutional level. 
This study is based on data from the Payscale.com, IPEDS Data Center, the 
Department of Education Statistics, and Barron’s Guide to College selectivity rankings.  
Payscale.com serves as an online career research center of compensation information for 
both employers and individuals. The website obtains its information by offering a free-of-
charge salary survey that asks about specifics of individual’s jobs, including 
compensation factors.
59
 The data from each survey is subsequently run through 
Payscale.com’s data-cleaning algorithm to validate and identify potential outliers and 
biases within the data.  For each school, Payscale.com provides a salary range for each 
degree type of the school’s graduates.  Each year, Payscale.com releases its College 
Salary Report, in which it provides the ranking of the school, highest starting salary to 
lowest starting salary, region, school type, mid-career salary, and percent of students with 
high job meanings. However, because not all of the schools included in this study are on 
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the College Salary Report, the starting salary given from the report could not be used in 
order to remain consistent with the data.  To obtain AVGINC2, I took the average of the 
logarithms of the minimum and maximum salary for each school’s bachelor’s degree. 
AVGINC1 is just the average of the minimum and maximum salaries for each school.  
The magnitude of the coefficients did not significantly change for the estimated 
coefficients, so AVGINC2 was used as the main dependent variable in the regression 
(Table 2 and 3). According to labor economic theory, income is a logarithmic function 
rather than a linear function.  As such, I converted the minimum and maximum salaries 
given on Payscale.com to logarithmic functions, and then took the average of the 
logarithms.   
The collection of variables from every institution in the 2012 IPEDS universe that 
describe each institution’s characteristics was obtained from the 2012 Institutional 
Characteristics survey.  This analysis includes 849 colleges from the IPEDS 2012 
universe, 17 of the colleges included are online-only universities.  The average income of 
graduates is $68,189.93 (Table 8).  A fully copy of the descriptive statistics can be found 
in the list of tables.   
Only including 17 online only universities could potentially lead to inconclusive 
results.  The extremely small sample of online universities creates a very wide confidence 
interval, and could have increase the magnitude of estimated coefficient on college type.     
As a result of this analysis depending heavily on individuals’ responses to the IPEDS 
and Payscale.com’s survey questions, the sample for the primary analysis is restricted to 
survey respondents, as well as the respondents who are employed and earning an income.  
As the data is limited to schools and students who respond to the survey, an analysis on 
42 
 
this data might yield inaccurate results, as the data reflects only a sample of the survey 
respondents rather than every school and graduate.   Furthermore, AVGINC2 might be 
biased, as the reported salaries on Payscale.com are self-reported.  The bias also may 
stem from the difference in ages of each college.  Older colleges may have older, more 
established alumni reporting salaries that might be higher than the salary of a younger 
graduate.  An abbreviated set of data can be found in the appendix. 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This project seeks to verify whether or not college type has an effect on students’ 
salaries. By building an econometric model, the size, direction, and magnitude of the 
effect college type has on earnings can be estimated. In other words, this regression can 
determine if earning a college degree from an online university results in a higher or 
lower salary on average than a student would earn if the degree was obtained through a 
traditional university. However, instead of looking at the effect on an individual level, 
meaning looking at individuals’ starting salaries, this study compares the effect on an 
institutional level, between undergraduate schools. 
 
The Regression 
 
An OLS estimation regresses the dependent variable, the average salary of students from 
each institution, on the independent variables. The population relationship reads as: 
 
AVGINC2i = 0 + 1STUFACRi + 2ENROLLMENTi + 3GRADRATE1i + 
4NETTUITIONi + 5PROFITi + 6PUBLICi + 7TYPEi + 8MOSTCOMPi + 
9HIGHLYCOMPi + 10VERYCOMPi + 11COMPi + 12LESSCOMPi + 13SPECIALi 
+14WESTi + 15MIDWESTi + 16SOUTHi + i    
43 
 
 
 
AVGINC2 was obtained by taking the average of the logarithms of the maximum 
and minimum salary reported on Payscale.com.   
The independent variables included in the regression describe the quality of each 
school, the level of selectivity, characteristics of the student body and the region of the 
United States in which the school is located. For this model, college type, named TYPE, 
is defined as online or traditional in addition to public versus private and for-profit versus 
not-for-profit. The estimated coefficient on TYPE, which takes on a value of 1 if the 
school is an online university, and 0 if the schools is a traditional university, quantifies 
the estimated effect college type has on average income.   
Net tuition (NETTUITION) was included in the model as a measure of college 
quality, similarly to Zhang’s method (2005).   Dale and Krueger (2011) calculated net 
tuition by subtracting the average amount of grant aid dollars received by undergraduate 
students from the sticker price tuition.  NETTUITION in this model was calculated in the 
same manner, with the sticker price of tuition coming from the Department of 
Education’s 2012 Tuition and Enrollment Figures and the average amount of aid taken 
from the IPEDS 2012 Institutional Characteristic Survey.
60
For this model, the average 
amount of aid is assumed to be per student, rather than conditional on whether or not the 
student receives aid or not.  However, if this variable is the average amount of aid given 
per the number of students who actually receive grants rather than per total student, then 
this variable could provide an inaccurate measure of net tuition.  Furthermore, it is 
unclear whether or not room and board costs are included in the average aid number, as 
room and board chargers are excluded from the tuition sticker price.   
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Graduation rate (GRADRATE1) serves as a measure of student ability as well as 
college quality. Graduating from college requires a certain degree of student ability.  In 
this model, due to lack of data on the online universities, a reported graduation rate in the 
IPEDS 2012 Institutional Characteristic Survey could not be used.  As a result, 
GRADRATE1 was calculated by dividing the total number of graduates by total 
enrollment number.  While this number does not yield a true graduation rate, it is the best 
possible estimate for graduation rate given the lack of data.   
Dummy variables that describe the level of selectivity school were also included 
in the model.  Barron’s uses seven selectivity categories: most competitive 
(MOSTCOMP), highly competitive (HIGHLYCOMP), very competitive (VERYCOMP), 
competitive (COMP), less competitive (LESSCOMP), non-competitive and special 
(SPECIAL).  All online universities fall under the non-competitive category, as there are 
minimal requirements to apply and be accepted into an online university.  The special 
school category includes schools that teach a specialized curriculum for a specific trade 
or subject.  Art schools and culinary schools are examples of the types of schools 
included within the category.  The non-competitive selectivity category is omitted from 
the model, so all estimated coefficients are relative to non-competitive schools. 
Differences in price levels as well as costs of living in the four regions of the 
United States – West, Midwest, South and East – may create differences in the incomes.  
A student who is working in New York, for example, may have a higher base salary than 
a student working in Alabama, simply because the cost of living in New York is much 
higher than Alabama.  Thus, every salary in New York must be higher in order to account 
for higher costs of living.  In order to control for these differences, the dummy variables 
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WEST, MIDEWEST and SOUTH were added to the regression to describe the location 
of the school.  If a school is located in the western region of the United States, the 
variable WEST takes on a value of 1, and 0 for the variables MIDWEST and SOUTH.  
The omitted region is the eastern region, so if a school is located within the eastern region 
of the United States, there will be values of 0 in all of the location variables.  
Expected Signs  
 
College Quality Variables 
  
STUFACR < 0.  As the student to faculty ratio increases, AVGINC2 decreases, because 
lower student to faculty ratios indicate more learning in the classroom and a more 
interactive class environment, holding all other independent variables constant.  More 
interactive class environments encourage students to be engaged and proactive in 
participating.  In addition to student to faculty ratio representing a causal determinant of 
better learning, student to faculty ratio can also serve as a proxy for resources of the 
school or student ability.  Schools with lower student to faculty ratios may be able to 
provide students with more resources, such as bigger libraries and career services centers, 
to help students land jobs, as the school can spend more money per student.   
 
ENROLLMENT ? 0.  As the total enrollment for the undergraduate school increases, it is not 
clear if AVGINC2 increases or decreases.  Schools with high total undergraduate 
enrollments have access to much larger alumni networks that provide excellent job 
opportunities for recent graduates.  However, larger total enrollments also mean that even 
though there is a large alumni network available to the students, there are a much greater 
number of students competing with each other jobs. Moreover, schools with larger total 
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enrollments may be experiencing significant returns to scale as schools with a high 
number of students are receiving tuition from a greater number of students and can thus 
afford to provide their students with better quality equipment, learning facilities faculty 
and resources.  The direction of the effect total enrollment has on average income is not 
obvious.   
 
GRADRATE1 > 0.  As the graduation rate increases, AVGINC2 increases, because schools 
that have high graduation rates indicate that more of their students have the motivation 
and resources to be able to complete a bachelor’s degree program, holding all other 
independent variables constant.   However, increases in graduation rate might occur as a 
result of the impact of other factors, such as family income or peer effects.  Graduation 
rate could increase as a result of more able students attending the school, but it also can 
increase as a result of social aspects, such as students feeling pressure to graduate with all 
of their friends.   
 
Financial Aid Variables 
 
NETTUITION > 0.  As the net tuition increases, AVGINC2 increases, because more 
expensive schools are often thought to be of higher quality schools, and students who 
attend higher-quality, more selective schools will earn more than students who do not, 
holding all other independent variables constant. NETTUITION can also be seen as a 
proxy for family income.  Previous studies suggest that family income is positively 
correlated with better labor market outcomes, as families with higher incomes may be 
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able to provide their children with more connections, resources and ability to obtain 
higher paying jobs.  NETTUITION can be thought of a proxy for family income in the 
sense that families with higher incomes can afford schools with high tuition.  Thus, as 
NETTUITION increase, AVGINC2 increases because family income is positively 
correlated with NETTUITION and AVGINC2, holding all other independent variables 
constant. 
 
College Type Variables 
 
PROFIT < 0.  If the school is a for-profit school, the AVGINC2 decreases, because 
according to Baily, Badway and Gumport (2001), many educators believe that for-profit 
institutions are less committed to the humanistic educational objectives of higher 
education, and instead are focused on the market transactions the institution creates.
61
  
Therefore, students who attend a for-profit university are not receiving an education that 
is of a comparable quality of students who attend not-for-profit institutions.  Students 
who receive higher-quality education will earn more than students who do not because 
they will be better equipped with a valuable skill set that is rewarded in the labor market, 
holding all other independent variables constant.   
  
PUBLIC ? 0.  If the college is a public institution, it is not obvious whether or not the 
AVGCINC1 increases or decreases.    Some of the highest quality schools in the United 
States are public universities.  With this in mind, it would make sense that if the school is 
a public university, then AVGINC2 would increase as well because higher quality and 
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more selective institutions are expected to have significant and positive returns, holding 
all other independent variables constant.  Yet in the study conducted by Brewer, Eide, 
and Ehrenberg (1999), they found a large return to attending an elite private institution, 
and weak evidence to suggest a return to attending an elite public university.
62
  They did 
not provide a specific reason for this difference in labor market returns, thus there is no 
basis to determine the direction of the effect that public universities have on average 
income.  Furthermore, as public universities suffer from being under-funded by state 
governments, these institutions might not have as much money at their disposal to 
provide students with the highest quality resources as the more expensive private schools 
do.  
 
TYPE ? 0.  Previous research does not indicate if the type of school will increase or 
decrease AVGINC2, perhaps due to lack of data and research on this specific subject.  
One hypothesis if the school is an online-only university, AVGINC2 decreases, because 
online universities are non-selective institutions.  More ambitious and motivated students 
may want to attend highly selective schools.  These student characteristics are highly 
rewarded in the labor market and would thus create a significant and positive return to 
attending a highly selective school.  On the other hand, if the school is an online-only 
university, AVGINC2 increases, because students who attend online universities can be 
older students who already have a job and need to complete a bachelor’s degree program 
to advance in the labor market.   Online university students, in this case, are already 
earning an income and are therefore more likely to have higher incomes on average than 
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recent graduates of traditional universities.   Completing an online degree requires 
significant motivation and persistence, characteristics that will also be rewarded in the 
labor market. 
 
Selectivity Variables 
 
MOSTCOMP > 0.  If the school is a “most competitive” school, the AVGINC1 increases, 
because most selective schools have a high level of the faculty, and a better output.  
Furthermore, if more-able students attend better and more selective schools, capturing 
selection bias, average income increases as ambition and motivation are student 
characteristics that are rewarded in the labor market.  Previous literature suggests that 
there are significant and positive returns to college selectivity.  However, the research by 
Dale and Kreuger (2011), Black and Smith (2006), and others stress the importance of 
including multiple measures of college quality.  As the level of selectivity provides a 
single vantage point on college quality, it is unlikely that colleges only have a single 
quality dimension.
63
 
 
HIGHLYCOMP, VERYCOMP, COMP, SPECIAL > 0. If the school is a “highly competitive, very 
competitive, competitive or special” school, the AVGINC2 increases, because at the 
highly competitive schools, students are still receiving a high-quality education 
experience, as highly competitive schools have a high level of the faculty, and a better 
output, holding all other independent variables constant.   
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LESSCOMP < 0. If the school is a “less competitive” school, the AVGINC2 decreases, 
because less competitive schools have lower levels of faculty and student output, holding 
all other independent variables constant. 
Regression Controls 
 
Previous research suggests that the quality of the college the student attends plays 
a significant role in the student’s future earnings.  The research conducted by Dale and 
Krueger (2011) supports the claim that student ability strongly influences determine 
successful the student will be as a participant in the labor force, rather than the 
characteristics of the college the student attends.
64
  Whereas the research conducted by 
Zhang, Monks and Brewer, Eiden and Ehrenberg reinforces the idea that there are 
significant and positive returns to college quality and selectivity.  Highly selective 
institutions might provide more labor market preparation given their access to more 
resources and overall learning experience. To control for college quality each school’s 
student-to-faculty ratio, and college type variables will be used to proxy variables. 
Barron’s index of college selectivity will serve as measures of college selectivity. The 
index consists of seven categories:  most competitive, highly competitive, very 
competitive, competitive, less competitive, non-competitive and special.  
However, if more motivated and ambitious students attend the more selective 
schools, selection bias could infiltrate the results.
65
  These valuable characteristics are 
often rewarded in the labor market and can greatly impact a student’s future earnings.  
Furthermore, as Dale and Krueger note, the same valuable characteristics that admissions 
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officers are looking for when selecting students for their college are the same to traits that 
employers are seeking when hiring and promoting workers.
66
  Therefore, as Dale and 
Krueger (2011) discuss in their research, student ability should be accounted for within 
the regression. Dale and Krueger (2011) also state that neglecting to include a measure of 
student ability will yield biased estimated coefficients and render inconclusive results.  
Unfortunately, it is not possible to quantify such personal qualities.  To correct for the 
bias in the estimated coefficients caused by omitting a variable that measures student 
ability, most previous studies, such as Dale and Kreuger (2011), used the average SAT 
score of the freshmen class of the colleges each student applied to as a proxy for student 
ability.
67
  More able students may choose to apply and to attend schools with a freshmen 
class that have higher average SAT scores.  However, using average SAT scores, the 
most common proxy for ability, is not available nor useful in this case, since the online 
universities have no SAT requirement in order for a student to be accepted.  Moreover, an 
average SAT proxy would not be viable in this model as the data is not individual level 
data.  In order to attempt to control for ability in this model, the graduation rate for each 
school will be used. According to Wooldridge, in order for a proxy variable to be viable, 
the proxy must be redundant, and uncorrelated with the omitted variable and each of the 
other regressors.
68
  It is always assumed that a proxy satisfies the redundancy condition; 
however, it does not always satisfy the second property. 
69
 If the proxy turns out to be 
correlated with one or more of the independent variables, then the proxy is imperfect.
70
  
An OLS with an imperfect proxy still yields inconsistent estimated coefficients.  The 
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hope is that the bias on each of the regressors is smaller in magnitude than if the proxy 
was omitted from the linear regression.
71
 As it turns out, graduation rate is irrelevant in 
explaining wage once the unobserved student characteristics have been controlled for.  
By definition, ability and ambition affect wage, thus the school’s graduation rate would 
not matter if true ability or motivation were known.  However, the concern that the 
graduation rate does not control for all of the bias remains. 
Net tuition is also included in this model in as a measure of the cost-effectiveness, 
in addition to college quality, of a bachelor’s degree.  In order to obtain net tuition, this 
model employs the same methodology as Dale and Krueger in their 2011 paper, and 
subtract the average amount of aid received by undergraduate students from the tuition 
sticker price. Net tuition may also be considered a proxy for family income, as this model 
does not employ any other controls for this variable.  Family income, as demonstrated in 
Monks’s research, serves as a proxy for a student’s ability to pay for school.  Net tuition 
may be correlated with family income, as family income increases the family’s ability to 
pay for a high cost school increases as well.  Additionally, family income might have a 
positive effect on income as it may be correlated with better labor market outcomes.  
Families with higher incomes may have access to more job opportunity connections, so it 
is not necessarily all of the school’s resources and characteristics influencing a student’s 
ability to get a job but now the family connections have an effect as well.   
Initial Hypothesis 
 
Results from previous research, such Black and Smith (1998), Monks (1999) and 
Brewer, Eiden, and Ehrenburg (1999), suggest that college type has a positive and 
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significant impact on income.  In other words, it pays to attend a highly selective, private 
institution.  In this model, college type is defined as online or traditional university.  As 
online universities today are considered non-competitive institutions, previous research 
would suggest that students who attend traditional universities have higher incomes than 
students who attend online universities.  The results do not suggest significant returns to 
college type.  TYPE was found to be statistically insignificant, supporting the findings of 
Dale and Krueger (2011).  The initial hypothesis predicts that TYPE would have a 
significant negative impact on income; however, the results do not suggest that college 
type has any significant impact or effect on income.  On the other hand, college 
selectivity variables, including MOSTCOMP, HIGHLYCOMP and VERYCOMP, were 
found to be statistically significant, consistent with the findings of previous research.   
RESULTS 
 
Analysis  
TYPE is statistically insignificant, meaning the type of college a student attends, 
online versus traditional, has no significant impact on income, holding all other 
independent variables constant.  Only seven variables out of the initial regression were 
found to be statistically significant (Table 2).  The results suggest strong, positive returns 
to college selectivity and quality.  In addition, students who graduate from schools 
located in the eastern region of the United States have higher average incomes than 
students who graduate from schools located in the mid-western or southern region of the 
country.  20.7% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the variance in 
the independent variables (Table 2).   
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F-test for Overall Statistical Significance 
 
The F-test for overall significance provides more statistically concrete evidence to 
describe the accuracy of the regression, as it is a formal hypothesis test for the overall fit 
of the model.
72
  The F-test determines whether or not as a group the independent 
variables have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable.  The test is 
conducted by taking the explained sum of squares divided by the number of independent 
variables in the regression, that quantity is then divided by the residual sum of squares 
divided by the degrees of freedom.
73
  If the resulting number is greater than the critical 
value, then we can conclude that there is a linear relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables.  On the other hand, if the calculated f-statistic is 
less than the critical value, then there is no linear relationship.  The null-hypothesis, H0 
states that the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero; whereas the 
alternative hypothesis, H1, states the estimated coefficients are statistically different from 
zero.  The calculated f-statistic for the model is 14.189 (Table 2).  As the calculated F-
statistic is larger than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected, and therefore the 
group of estimated coefficients is statistically different from zero.  Thus, the f-statistic 
concludes that there is a linear relationship between average income and the independent 
variables.   
T-tests for Statistical Significance: 
 
The t-test for significant provides a formal hypothesis test to determine whether or 
not the individual independent variable has a statistically significant impact in the value 
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of the dependent variables.  The test shows whether or not there is a large enough 
difference between the value of the estimated coefficient and zero, relative to the spread 
of the estimated coefficient, to confirm a linear relationship between the individual 
independent variable and the dependent variable.
74
  The t-statistic is calculated by 
dividing the standard error into the difference of the estimated coefficient from zero.
75
  If 
the calculated t-statistic is greater than the critical value, then we can conclude that there 
is a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable and AVGINC1.   
STUFACR, NETTUITION, MOSTCOMP, HIGHLYCOMP, VERYCOMP, 
MIDWEST AND SOUTH were all found to be statistically significant (Table 2).   
 
Interpretations on Coefficients: 
 
Only the variables found to be statistically significant, as well as the coefficient 
on TYPE are further discussed.   The remaining estimated coefficients were found to not 
be statistically significant from zero, and thus have no statistical impact on the dependent 
variable.   
For every one student increase in the student-to-faculty ratio, average income 
increases by 0.0738% (Table 2), holding all other independent variables constant.  
Student-to-faculty ratio, similarly to Black and Smith (2006) serves as a measure of 
college quality.  Student-to-faculty ratio can additionally serve as a proxy for school 
resources.  STUFACR has a significant and positive relationship with average income.  
However, this result is unexpected student-to-faculty ratio most often has a negative 
relationship with quality, meaning schools with higher ratios are considered lower quality 
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schools.  Yet this result is not very worrisome as a one student increase in the ratio only 
accounts for a small change in average income, holding all other independent variables 
constant. 
Net tuition, the other measure of college quality, was also statistically significant.   
For every one dollar increase in net tuition, the average income of graduates from each 
school increases by 0.0000647% (Table 2), holding all other independent variables 
constant. Thus, if net tuition increases by $10,000, then the average income of graduates 
will increase by 0.647%, holding all other variables constant.  More expensive schools 
should provide more resources to improve the quality of education than less expensive 
schools, as is often assumed, in accordance with basic economic principles that higher 
prices reflect higher quality products.  Thus, that if the price of the education is higher, 
than the quality of the education must be high as well.  As a result, schools with higher 
tuition are able to pay for more expensive teachers, better equipment, provide more 
library resources and services, and other resources so that the college can provide a 
higher quality college education for their students.  Students who receive a higher quality 
education will be better prepared when entering the labor market.  However the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient suggests that students who attend more expensive 
schools will only be marginally rewarded in the labor market.  For significant increase in 
tuition, $10,000 for example, average income only increases slightly, suggesting that 
while this variable has a statistical impact on average income, attending more expensive 
schools does not have a large effect on average income.  As NETTUITION served as a 
proxy for college quality and family income in this model, this result does not fully imply 
large, positive returns to college quality and family income.   
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This model only included two measures of college quality and neglected to 
include an average SAT variable as a proxy for quality due to lack of data on the online 
universities as well as the data being institutional level rather than individual level data.  
While the model includes more than one proxy for quality, as Black and Smith (2006) 
and Zhang (2005) note failing to adopt multiple proxies for quality may result in an 
underestimation of the wage effect of college quality and type.
76
  On the other hand, as 
both of these independent variables serve as measures of college quality, the results imply 
that there are in fact significant and positive returns to attending higher quality 
institutions.   
If the school is an online-only university, the average income of graduates from 
each school decreases by 5.45% (Table 2), holding all other independent variables 
constant.  Although the t-test for significance indicates that college type has no effect on 
average income.  The data may lead to inconclusive results because of having an 
extremely limited sample of online-only institutions.  A limited sample of online 
universities causes the confidence intervals to be very wide.  In order for there to be an 
effect of college type, there would have to be a difference in incomes of students 
attending online versus traditional universities of almost $10,000 (Table 3), suggesting 
college type has no effect on average income, as such a large difference in incomes 
between online and traditional universities is unlikely.   
Furthermore, the results suggest significant returns to attending more selective 
schools, as the estimated coefficients on the three most-selective ranking categories 
collectively were statistically significant and positive.  For example, if the school is a 
most competitive school, the average income of graduates increases by about 7.1% 
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(Table 2), holding all other independent variables constant; if the school is a highly 
competitive school, the average income of graduates increases by about 4.2% (Table 2), 
holding all other independent variables constant; finally, if the school is a very 
competitive school, the average income of graduates increases by about 1.8% (Table 2), 
holding all other independent variables constant.  As the level of selectivity increases, the 
wage effect of selectivity increases as well.  However, less competitive schools have no 
effect on increasing or decreasing the average income of graduates.  These results suggest 
that students who attend more selective schools, ranging from very competitive to most 
competitive, will have on the average a higher income than students who attend less 
competitive schools.   
 However, selectivity bias within the model created by an omitted variable bias 
could, in this case, be artificially inflating the overall effect of college type has on 
average income.  More students might attend more selective schools.  The characteristics 
of higher quality, such as ambition, motivation, and overall intelligence, are the same 
characteristics that are greatly valued by employers and are thus rewarded in the labor 
market.  In other words, highly motivated and ambitious students are more likely to 
become highly motivated and productive workers.  Yet this model does not account for 
these student characteristics within the model.  Thus, this unobservable variable that 
describes student ability is excluded from this model.  Unfortunately, the omission of this 
relevant independent variable results in biased estimated coefficients on the other 
independent variables.   If the estimated coefficients are biased, the results are 
misleading.  In this case, we expect the direction of the bias on the other estimated 
coefficients to be positive, as the direction of the expected value of the relationship 
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between the included independent variables and student ability (positive) is multiplied by 
the direction of the coefficient on student ability (positive).
77
   Thus, omitting student 
ability would then increase the overall effect college selectivity has on average income.   
Regression Testing: 
Heteroskedasticity: 
 
Heteroskedasticity is the violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity, meaning 
that the observations of the error term are drawn from a distribution that has a constant 
variance.
78
  If the assumption of homoscedasticity is met, then it can be assumed that all 
of the observations of the error term are being drawn from the same distribution.  With 
pure heteroskedasticity, the variance of the error term is not constant; meaning the 
variance of the distribution of the error term depends on a specific observation.
79
  
Although heteroskedasticity does not create bias in the estimated coefficients, OLS is 
now not the minimum-variance estimator as well as it creates bias within the standard 
errors.  Bias in the standard errors results in unreliable hypothesis testing. 
80
  
In order to detect heteroskedasticity within the model, scatter plots of each non-
dummy independent variable are plotted against the dependent variable.  This provides an 
informal method to determine if one or more independent variables is heteroskedastic, as 
we can see in the graphs whether or not the spread of the error term or the dependent 
variable changes as the values of the independent variables increase.
81
 However there are 
two formal statistical tests to detect heteroskedasticity: the Park Test and the White Test.  
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The Park Test looks to determine if there is heteroskedasticity in the model with respect 
to specific independent variables.
82
     
The scatter plot graphs potentially indicate heteroskedasticity within the model due 
to STUFACR and ENROLLMENT (Graph 1 and 2).  For both variables, as the 
independent variable increases, the spread of the error term decreases.  In a 
homoscedastic model, the spread of the error term would remain constant as the 
independent variable increases. 
The Park Test 
 
The Park Test is conducted by regression the log of the sum of the squared 
residuals and the log of the independent variable.  Two-tailed t-tests are then conducted 
on each of the coefficients.  Heteroskedasticity exists within the model if and only if the 
calculated t-statistic is greater than the critical value.
83
  
The estimated coefficients for the log of student-to-faculty ratio was found to be 
statistically significant (Table 9), while the estimated coefficient of the log of total 
enrollment was statistically insignificant (Table 10).  Furthermore, the scatter plot graph 
(Graph 1) suggests that as STUFACR increases, the spread of the error term decreases.  
Thus, there is heteroskedasticity within the model with respect to STUFACR.   
  
The White Test 
 
The White Test determines whether or not there is heteroskedasticity with respect 
to one or more variables in the model.  This test is conducted by conducting a one-sided 
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Chi-squared test of the sum of the squared residuals.  Heteroskedasticity exists within the 
model if the calculated chi-squared value is greater than the critical value.
84
   
However, because 26.23775 (Table 11) is less than 26.3, the chi-sqaured critical 
value, we can conclude that there is not heteroskedasticity with respect to one or more 
independent variables in the model.  The model will still be corrected for 
heteroskedasticity as the park test revealed heteroskedasticity in the model with respect to 
STUFACR. 
Multicollinearity: 
 
Mulicollinearity is a violation of one of the classical assumptions, which states that 
the explanatory variables are not perfect linear functions of each other.
85
  In other words, 
if perfect multicollinearity exists, then the variation in one independent variable can be 
completely explained by movements in a different independent variable.
86
  On the other 
hand, imperfect multicollinearity occurs if there is a linear relationship between two or 
more independent variables that significantly affects the estimation of the coefficients of 
the variables.
87
 Multicollinearity creates bias in the standard errors of the coefficients, 
and thus leads to unreliable hypothesis testing.   
Two methods commonly used to determine if multicollinearity exists in the model is 
to look at the simple correlation between two independent variables, partial correlation, 
and the variance inflation factor test (VIF).   
Simple Correlation 
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 The correlation matrix gives the simple linear correlations between each 
individual explanatory variables and the dependent variable, as well as the explanatory 
variables with the each other explanatory variable.  The correlation matrix is used to 
detect multicollinearity.  If an independent variable is highly correlated with the 
dependent variable but even more highly correlated with another independent variable, 
then multicollinarity may exist within the model.  The correlation matrix (Table 12) does 
not suggest any evidence of multicollinearity within the model. 
Variance Inflation Factor 
 
If multicollinarity is apparent in the model, the standard errors of the coefficients are 
artificially inflated.  Calculating the Variance Inflation Factor will illustrate how much 
the standard errors are actually increased.  To calculate the VIF, the difference between 1 
and the R
2
 from a regression run with just the independent variable against the dependent 
variable, that quantity divided by 1.
88
  If the calculated VIF has a value of five or greater, 
then multicollinearity exists in the model with respect to that independent variable.  
None of the Variation Inflation Factors (Table 14) have values greater than five, 
and thus do not suggest multicollinarity exits in the model.   
Interactive Dummy Variable and F-test on a Subset of Coefficients 
  
The independent variables included in the regression are broken up into categories 
of college quality, type, enrollment, selectivity and region.  Even though not every, or 
none of the variables included in a subset of coefficients are statistically significant, the 
subset as a group may have a linear relationship with average income.  In order to 
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determine whether or not there is a relationship between the subset and average income, a 
regression must be run excluding the variables in a single subset, giving the RSSRestricted.  
The RSS from the original regression, including the subset, is subtracted from the 
RSSRestricted, divided by the number of variables in the subset, and that quantity is divided 
by the original RSS divided by the degrees of freedom.  A F-test is then performed, if the 
null hypothesis is rejected, then we can conclude that the coefficients of the subset are 
statistically different zero, and there is a significant linear relationship between the subset 
and the dependent variable.   
The regional variables were placed in the regression as an attempt to adjust for 
differences in costs of living throughout the different regions of the United States.  The 
regional variables themselves account for differences in income, the dependent variable.  
However, net tuition might be dependent on region, as regions with higher costs of living 
may charge higher tuition per student.  A series of interactive dummy variables, 
interacting each region with net tuition, were tested to attempt to adjust for the difference 
in net tuition based on region.  None of the interactive terms were significantly different 
from zero (Table 4, 5, 6).  In order to determine whether or not the interaction term 
should remain in the regression, even though it was found to be statistically insignificant, 
an F-test on a subset of coefficients including TYPE and the interaction terms, 
WEST*NETTUITION, MIDWEST*NETTUITION, and SOUTH*NETTUITION, was 
run.  The results of the f-test led to a rejection of the null hypothesis, and to conclude that 
there is a significant linear relationship between the subset of coefficients and average 
income.   
Final Regression 
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For the final regression, all insignificant variables were removed from the 
regression (Table 15).  However TYPE was kept in the regression, as it is the variable 
this model is focusing on.  The regression was again corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
Excluding all statistically insignificant variables did not yield large changes in the 
significant estimated coefficients.  All of the estimated coefficients of the statistically 
significant variables but STUFACR increased very slightly, but remained essentially 
unchanged.  The estimated coefficient on TYPE, on the other hand, decreased to -
0.009122 (Table 15), suggesting that the magnitude of the effect TYPE has on AVGINC2 
is almost zero.  Even though WEST was found to be statistically insignificant, it remains 
in the final regression as the group of regional variables has a statistically significant 
impact on AVGINC2. 
Removing the statistically insignificant variables created almost no changes in the 
regression.  Thus we can conclude that their place in the regression is irrelevant.  
Furthermore, the estimated coefficient on TYPE getting close to zero in the final 
regression confirms our hypothesis that TYPE has no impact on average income.   
Net Present Value of Attending College 
 
 While the results from this model suggest that college type has no statistical wage 
effect, college type may still have an impact on income.  Online universities cost, on 
average, $6256.20 less per year in net tuition than traditional universities (Table 15).  As 
the model predicts that college type has no statistical effect on average income, it is 
important to determine whether or not students earn extra income by attending a 
traditional university, despite the higher tuition costs. 
65 
 
In order to determine whether or not traditional university students earn additional 
income even with higher tuition costs, the net present value of the benefits of attending a 
traditional university as opposed to an online university is thus calculated.  If the net 
present value of the benefits of attending a traditional university versus an online 
university is positive, then the additional income students earn outweighs the additional 
tuition costs they must pay in order to attend a traditional university.  Net present value is 
calculated by  
      (        )    (     ) 
where the PV(Benefits) represents the present value of an annuity with the estimated 
coefficient on TYPE (Table 3), and PV(Costs) represents the present value of the costs of 
attending a traditional university versus an online university, the difference in net tuition 
for traditional and online universities.  
  To obtain the present value of the costs of attending a traditional university as 
opposed to an online university was calculated by 
  (     )  ∑
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 The present value of the benefits of attending a traditional university versus an 
online university, meaning the difference in average income between each type, was 
calculated by treating the difference in average income as an annuity. 
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The estimated coefficient on TYPE, for the purpose of this exercise, was taken from the 
regression output using the average value of each independent variable for each type of 
school (Table 3) as a measure of the difference in average income earned by students 
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who attend traditional universities versus online universities.  Students who attend 
traditional universities earn $2565.37 (Table 15) more than students who attend online 
universities, holding all other independent variables constant. For the purpose of this 
calculation, it is assumed that students graduate and earn their degree in 4 years, and are 
all 22 years old when they graduate.  Moreover, it is assumed that students work from 
ages 22 until the standard retirement age, 67 years old.  Average income is assumed to 
remain constant for the students working life.   
For both calculations, i represents the discount rate.  Two different discount rates were 
used: a discount rate that takes into account the rate of return of schooling, i1, and the 
return on a financial portfolio of a blend of stocks and bonds, i2.  The rate of return to 
education for an average worker typically ranges from 5-12%.
89
 Thus, the value of i1 was 
calculated by taking the average of 5% and 12%.  The rate of return on stocks and bonds 
was calculated using a blend of 60% stocks and 40% bonds, with the rate of returns on 
stocks and bonds coming from historical prices and returns on the S&P 500 and 10-year 
US Treasury Bonds from 1970 to 2013 (Table 15) respectively.   
 Net present value was then calculated by subtracting the present value of the cost 
of attending college from the present value of the benefits of attending college.  The 
resulting net present value of the benefits of attending a traditional university, when using 
a discount rate of the returns to college tuition, was $9,687.35 (Table 15).  If the rate of 
return on a financial portfolio of stocks and bonds is used, the net present value of the 
benefits of attending a traditional university is $12,928.74 (Table 15), suggesting that 
                                                     
89
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students who attend traditional universities earn more additional income than online 
university students, despite higher tuition costs.     
Thus, students who attend traditional universities will experience greater labor 
market returns, even after paying higher tuition.  Therefore, online universities cannot 
serve as a cost-effective substitute for traditional university.  Instead, the results imply 
that even though traditional universities have, on average, higher costs, in the long run it 
is worth it to pay almost double the amount per year in tuition costs to attend a traditional 
university.   
CONCLUSION 
 
While college type, defined as online-only versus traditional university, even after 
the final run, has no statistical impact on average income, the results suggest that college 
selectivity has a strong, significant and positive impact on average income.  Furthermore, 
the model finds significant and positive returns to college quality.  However, while the 
proxies for college quality, student to faculty ratio and net tuition, were found to be 
statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect these variables have on average 
income is minimal.  Large changes in both of the college quality variables only yield 
marginal changes in average income.  Perhaps this effect would have been stronger if 
more proxies of college quality were included within the regression.  Moreover, a better 
measure of student ability could have changed the results as well.  Graduation rate, which 
was the variable initially expected to proxy for student ability and college quality, was 
also found to be statistically insignificant.  As almost all of the previous literature finds 
strong, positive returns to student ability, finding and incorporating a statistically 
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significant proxy for student ability would relieve the model of selection bias and provide 
accurate results.   Unfortunately, due to lack of data for online universities as well as 
using institutional level data, finding a viable proxy for student ability proves to be 
difficult so the bias remains within the model.    
The results ultimately do not support the claim that online universities cannot 
serve as a perfect substitute for a traditional university.  While the results do not provide 
evidence of attending an online university having a positive and significant impact on 
students’ average income, they neither suggest the presence of a negative impact on 
average income if the student attended an online university.  However, the net present 
value calculation illustrates that despite higher tuition costs of traditional universities, 
attending a traditional university yields a higher net present value than an online 
university.  Even though with respect to labor market outcomes, online universities may 
not be able to serve as a perfect substitute for a college education experience, it has the 
potential to with serious improvements in technology to create a better learning 
environment, trust in the working world, and more growth in the industry.   
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Appendix 1: Sample of the Data 
 
 
 
Name UNITID Location STUFACR GRTYPEGRTOTLT EFFYLEVEFYTOTLT(EF2012A) Min MAX AVGINC1 AVGINC GRADRATE1 GRADRATE TUITIONUAGRNTA NETTUITION
Colorado Technical University - Online 444158 CO 27 2 1390 2 39772 32013 92178 $62,095.00 $62,095.00 0.03494921 0.13979684 12368 4738 7630
American InterContinental University Online 445027 GA 42 2 2020 2 27100 33387 98949 66168 66168 0.07453875 0.29815498 14043 4919 9124
Johnson & Wales University Online 460349 RI 6 2 120 34746 73543 73543 0 3499 -3499
University of Phoenix Online 372213 AZ 41 2 53137 2 359464 36011 102813 69412 69412 0.14782287 0.59129148 9216 3751 5465
Strayer University 131803 15 2 18 2 2184 39533 114767 77150 77150 0.00824176 0.03296703 14850 1656 13194
Walden University 125231 CA 20 2 13823 30263 88562 59412 59412 0 10725 3045 7680
Capella University 413413 MN 28 2 13933 35287 98592 66939 66939 0 11952 3208 8744
American Sentinel University 460738 CO 13 2 1960 47182 86162 66672 66672 0 9120 11298 -2178
Ashford University 154022 CA 21 2 286 2 153446 29786 81731 55758 55758 0.00186385 0.00745539 9648 4970 4678
Brandman University 262086 CA 13 2 5878 25447 88084 56765 56765 0 4909 -4909
Columbia Southern University 450933 AL 82 2 125 2 25169 39791 89046 46800 46800 0.00496643 0.01986571 4800 2275 2525
American Public University System 449339 WV 23 2 16 2 89175 29590 90433 48100 48100 0.00017942 0.00071769 6000 3296 2704
Grantham University 442569 MO 17 2 14397 41788 119075 80431 80431 0 6360 1056 5304
Jones International University 444723 IL 46 2 4 2 4620 34817 100000 67408.5 67408.5 0.0008658 0.0034632 12720 3942 8778
Sullivan University 157793 KY 18 2 251 2 6449 36494 87793 62143 62143 0.03892076 0.15568305 17520 2516 15004
Western Governors University 433387 UT 41 2 108 2 34271 37204 100888 69046 69046 0.00315135 0.01260541 5780 4219 1561
Northcentral University 444130 AZ 2 2 680 0 4976 -4976
Harvey Mudd College 115409 CA ８ 2 180 2 784 59643 134002 96822.5 73300 0.22959184 0.91836735 44159 24421 19738
United States Naval Academy 164155 MD 9 1190 2 4536 62798 161486 112142 77100 0.26234568 1.04938272 0 0
Stevens Institute of Technology 186867 NJ 9 483 2 2575 51800 134140 92970 64900 0.18757282 0.75029126 41670 21133 20537
Babson College 164580 MA 13 443 2 2015 42055 134876 88465.5 59700 0.21985112 0.87940447 41888 28569 13319
Princeton University 186131 NJ 6 1228 2 5327 34862 137506 86184 56100 0.23052375 0.92209499 38650 35654 2996
United States Military Academy 197036 NY 7 1256 2 4592 57348 179956 118652 74000 0.27351916 1.09407666 0 0
Stanford University 243744 CA 12 1646 2 7063 41596 133781 87688.5 61300 0.23304545 0.93218179 41250 36893 4357
Harvard University 166027 MA 7 1679 2 10564 36216 135408 85812 55300 0.15893601 0.63574404 41250 37239 4011
Brown University 217156 RI 8 1464 2 6435 36309 139011 87660 52300 0.22750583 0.91002331 42808 31476 11332
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 166683 MA 8 1001 2 4503 51634 153967 102800.5 68600 0.22229625 0.88918499 41770 32572 9198
Colgate University 190099 NY 9 743 2 2871 37622 127809 82715.5 51800 0.25879485 1.03517938 44330 34425 9905
Yale University 130794 CT 6 1313 2 5405 38491 142790 90640.5 50000 0.24292322 0.97169288 42300 39324 2976
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Name
Colorado Technical University - Online
American InterContinental University Online
Johnson & Wales University Online
University of Phoenix Online
Strayer University
Walden University
Capella University
American Sentinel University
Ashford University
Brandman University
Columbia Southern University
American Public University System
Grantham University
Jones International University
Sullivan University
Western Governors University
Northcentral University
Harvey Mudd College
United States Naval Academy
Stevens Institute of Technology
Babson College
Princeton University
United States Military Academy
Stanford University
Harvard University
Brown University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Colgate University
Yale University
PROFIT TYPE PUBLIC MOSTCOMP HIGHLYCOMPVERYCOMP COMP LESSCOMP NONCOMP SPECIAL West MIDWEST SOUTH
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
